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FROM RETHINKING TO INTERNATIONALIZING
CRIMINAL LAW
George P. Fletcher*
Writing Rethinking Criminal Law ("Rethinking") was a gamble. No one had
ever written a serious book on comparative criminal law-in English or in any
other language. No one had ever addressed English-speaking readers with the
argument that some other system of legal thought-espoused by a nation defeated
in a major war just thirty years before-had a superior literature on criminal law
and a more refined way of thinking about the structure of criminal offenses. No
one had tried to present the system of criminal law as though it were a species of
"political and moral philosophy."1 If ever there was chutzpah, this was it.
The structure of Rethinking almost defied readers to find it interesting or
useful. The conventional way to write textbooks in continental Europe is to
distinguish between the general part and special part and devote a book to each.
The general part always receives attention first because it is considered the
foundation of the whole system. For all my devotion to philosophical and
Continental thinking, my basic training was in the common law, and I still thought
about law in the inductive style of the case method. This is why I took the highly
unconventional approach of beginning the book with the special part, initially with
a detailed analysis of the history of theft in the common law. I would have
thought that this choice of topics and the detailed analysis of the cases would turn
off most of my readers.
The approach was unfamiliar to almost everyone. The style of writing on the
Continent is always deductive and authoritative and-though I did not notice it in
the late 1970s-the Continental approach is almost always internal and parochial.
The German literature cites only German authors; the French cite only the
French. The Germans refer to their work on the general principles of criminal law
as Dogmatik-a term borrowed from the Catholic Church to refer to the
teachings offered by the priests to elaborate the tenets of the faith. This term
aptly describes the system of thought that the Germans have developed. They
have faith in a certain set of organizational distinctions, and their task is to
elaborate and explain the system.
* Cardozo Professor of Jurisprudence, Columbia Law School.
1. See George P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law xix (Little, Brown & Co. 1978).
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Common law lawyers have a similar set of dogmas. They are not aware of
the extent to which they subscribe to their ideas as a matter of faith. They
subscribe to certain formulae as though they were unquestionable truths-claims,
for example, about the necessity of mens rea and actus reus. They believe in the
indispensability of "policy" decisions and adhere to Holmesian realism ("general
propositions do not decide concrete cases"2) as though there were no other way to
think about law.3 At the outset I was restrained, in Rethinking, by the assumption
that I would not repeat these standard orthodoxies without subjecting them to a
thoroughgoing critique.
At the level of style and substance, Rethinking was an iconoclastic book. It
occurs to me now that it was also a conservative book. I will explain why.
I. THE BASICS OF RETHINKING
In late 1976 and 1977, when I was writing Rethinking, the greatest danger to
criminal law was the likelihood that the Model Penal Code would soon dominate
the entire field of discourse about the criminal law in the United States. Here is a
sampling of the positions on which MPC threatened to become the hegemonic
doctrine:
(1) There is no single rationale for punishment. Retributive and deterrent
and other purposes must all be considered.4
(2) The principle of lesser evils, or necessity, is the model for understanding
all claims of justification, including self-defense.5
(3) Insanity stands on its own: it need not be integrated into the theory of
excuses.
6
(4) There is no special category of defenses called "excuses. ' 7
(5) On newly recognized defenses, such as mistake of law, it is permissible
to shift the burden of persuasion to the defense .
2. See Lochner v. N.Y., 198 U.S. 45, 74-76 (1905) (Holmes, J. dissenting).
3. The leading books at the time were Jerome Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law (2d ed.,
Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1960), and Glanville Williams, Criminal Law: The General Part (2d ed., Stevens &
Sons Ltd. 1961).
4. Model Penal Code § 1.02(1) (ALI 1985).
5. Id. § 3.01 (declaring that the entire chapter is about "justification," an affirmative defense); Id. §
3.02 (defining lesser evils as though it were the paradigmatic justification).
6. There is no category of excuses in the Model Penal Code. Duress is regulated in Model Penal
Code § 2.09; insanity is regulated separately in Article 4. The special status of insanity as a directive to
punish, though by alternative means, was stressed in Herbert L. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal
Sanction 131-35 (Stan. U. Press 1968).
7. My first systematic treatment of the issues was George P. Fletcher, The Individualization of
Excusing Conditions, 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1269 (1974).
8. The burden is shifted on entrapment, Model Penal Code § 2.13(2), and mistake of law, Model
Penal Code § 2.04(4).
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(6) Whether attempted crimes result in harm should be irrelevant in
assessing punishment.9
(7) Impossible attempts should be punished.'1
(8) Inadvertent negligence is a suspect category of culpability. It should be
punished only in exceptional cases."
At the time it seemed to me that the debate about these basic issues was
dying out-in the law reviews, in conferences where I encountered my colleagues
in criminal law, and in the classroom, where the future of criminal law was being
cast.
Of course there were many other important issues raised in Rethinking, but I
would like to concentrate on these eight in order to profile the way in which
Rethinking had departed from the orthodoxy prevailing in the 1970s. Here are my
responses to the eight challenges posed by the MPC:
(1) First as a student and then a colleague of Herbert Morris at UCLA, I was
exposed to a way of thinking about justice in punishment that was radically
different from the muddled views in the literature and in the cases. 12 The solution
of the MPC was to adopt every conventional goal and urge judges to apply the
proper mix of all of them. 3 This struck me as the nadir of intellectual sloppiness.
The literature coming out of prestigious law schools on the East Coast was either
unreflectingly utilitarian and thus hostile to retributive thinking or insufficiently
rigorous to address the question of retribution properly.
14
(2) The MPC made a strong case that all claims of justification were
variations of the principle of balancing conflicting interests-thus self-defense was
simply a subcategory of the defense of necessity defined at the outset of Article 3
in the MPC and labeled "Justification Generally." American scholars were silent
on the question of whether all claims of justification were reducible to a single
heading or not. By contrast, the German literature on point was abundant and
thoughtful. Criminal lawyers were aware of the dubious grounding of necessity in
social interest and the roots of self-defense in theories of personal autonomy. Any
serious reader of Kant would know that the two defenses had totally different
9. Model Penal Code § 5.05(1) (the grade of attempt is the same as the grade for the offense
attempted).
10. The rationale is that the offender's intention plus partial execution shows that he or she is
dangerous. See Commentaries to the Model Penal Code § 5.01.
11. See Model Penal Code § 2.02(3) (unless otherwise provided, recklessness is the minimally
required state of culpability).
12. Herbert Morris had just published his classic article. See Herbert Morris, Persons and
Punishment, 52 Monist 475 (1968).
13. See Model Penal Code § 1.02.
14. The leading articles were: Jerome Michel & Herbert Wechsler, A Rationale of the Law of
Homicide: 1, 37 Colum. L. Rev. 701 (1937), and Henry M. Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 L. &
Contemp. Probs. 401 (1958).
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histories and rationales. 5 It seemed obvious to me that the drafters of the MPC
had not even begun to think about the issues.
(3) and (4) With regard to the theory of excuses, I also benefited greatly
from the study of German law, which treats insanity as a paradigmatic excuse16
along with mistake of law 17 and personal necessity. 18 Many of my early articles
focused on the failure of American and other common law systems, including the
MPC, to approach the subject of excuses systematically.1 9 The German approach
seemed to me clearly superior. The challenge was to find sufficient traces of the
same ideas to be able to plausibly argue that American law showed signs of
evolving in the same direction.
(5) The same systematic approach led me, in my first major article," to
oppose the common law practice of shifting the burden of persuasion on defensive
issues. I was convinced that historical trends opposed the common law on this
point. The Rome Statute establishing the ICC (International Criminal Court) has
validated my argument that the Continental tradition would prevail on this issue.2'
(6), (7), and (8) My position on the last three of the eight issues mentioned
above reflected an implicit philosophical commitment to thinking about human
action in a different way from the prevailing view of criminal action. I think of the
orthodox view as focusing on the isolated and atomistic will expressing itself in the
external world. This view is expressed in (6) by the rejection of consequences as
relevant to the appropriate punishment for attempts. Consequences are said to be
irrelevant because they are not subject to the "control" of the actor's will. The
same focus on the atomistic will, the intention to do wrong, supports in (7) the
imposition of liability for impossible attempts that pose no manifest danger to
anyone. Committed to the atomistic will as the core of criminal action, theorists
have been led in (8) to argue that if there is no "choice" there can be no
culpability. Thus, they conclude that inadvertent negligence (where there is no
22
conscious choice) should not be a basis for criminal liability.
The paradigmatic case of the atomistic theory of action is the lone individual
who pulls the trigger of a gun with the intent to kill. The actor is abstracted from
his or her context and setting. It does not matter whether the gun is loaded or
even whether the intended target is actually a living person or a wax dummy. The
15. See generally Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals (Mary Gregor trans., Cambridge U.
Press 1991).
16. StGB § 20 (1999).
17. StGB § 17.
18. StGB § 35.
19. See e.g. Fletcher, supra n. 7, at 1272; George P. Fletcher, The Right Deed for the Wrong Reason:
A Reply to Mr. Robinson, 23 UCLA L. Rev. 293, 315 (1975) (discussing necessity as an excuse).
20. George P. Fletcher, Two Kinds of Legal Rules: A Comparative Study of Burden-of-Persuasion
Practices in Criminal Cases, 77 Yale L.J. 880, 884 (1968).
21. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 67(1)(i) (opposing the shift of the
burden on any issue) (hereinafter Rome Statute).
22. See Alan Brudner, The Unity of the Common Law 221-38 (U. Cal. Press 1995); Jerome Hall,
Negligent Behavior Should Be Excluded from Penal Liability, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 632 (1963).
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important feature of the criminal action is the relationship between the choice to
kill and the expression of this choice in external bodily movements.
The atomistic nature of criminal conduct is a dogma like any other. It is
asserted and accepted without any evidence. The dogma is not hard to refute,23
but whether right or wrong, it holds on. It still influences discussions of moral luck
in assessing the relevance of consequences (6);24 it inspires recurrent assertions
that negligence is not a proper basis for liability (7); 2' and it reinforces the
hegemonic doctrine that it is permissible to punish impossible attempts according
to the actor's perception (8).26
The opposite position is a contextualized view of criminal wrongdoing, a
view that was expressed more or less in different passages in Rethinking. The
contextualized view treats criminal wrongdoing as a form of interaction between
offender and victim. Consequences cannot be separated from the action as
though they were purely contingent events. Shooting with the intent to kill and
the actual killing are bound together in a single event, captured both in our
language and in our conventional perceptions of the world.27
The contextualized view is anchored in our language and our social practices.
We have verbs for murder and rape, which imply the occurrence of consequences,
but we have no verbs in natural speech for "trying to kill" or "trying to rape." The
Ten Commandments are a benchmark for thinking about law precisely because
28they are based on actions coupled with harmful consequences.
The contextualized view of criminal wrongdoing recognizes that the critical
point for understanding crime is not the relation of the will to the body but the
relations of people to each other. Herb Morris had always stressed that a criminal
act breaches the offender's relationship and therefore requires some form of
repair. These views are closely associated with ordinary language philosophy,
which requires the analyst to attend to what people actually say and do in
particular real life contexts.
If we pay close attention to moral sentiments as they are actually expressed
in human interaction, then there is little doubt about the right position to take on
the conflict between the atomistic and contextualized theories of action. As to
point (6), you will consider the consequences of action in assessing the gravity of
wrongdoing; ordinary people would not even consider punishing their children in
23. H.L.A. Hart and Herbert Morris both published definitive refutations of the will theory of
action. See H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of the Law 101
(Oxford U. Press 1968); Herbert Morris, Dean Pound's Jurisprudence, 13 Stan. L. Rev. 185 (1960)
(reviewing Roscoe Pound's Jurisprudence).
24. See Joel Feinberg, Equal Punishment for Failed Attempts: Some Bad but Instructive Arguments
Against It, 37 Ariz. L. Rev. 117, 121 (1995); Sanford H. Kadish, Foreword: The Criminal Law and the
Luck of the Draw, 84 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 679, 684-86 (1994).
25. See Hall, supra n. 22.
26. In addition to the Model Penal Code, see Model Penal Code § 5.01, the leading proponent of
this position was Glanville Williams. See Glanville Williams, The Lords and Impossible Attempts, or
Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?, 45 Cambridge L.J. 33, 34 (1986).
27. See Hart, supra n. 23.
28. The one possible exception is the Tenth Commandment, which prohibits "coveting" one's
neighbor's house or wife. See Exodus 20:17 (King James).
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the same way whether they try and fail to hit a neighbor's kid, or actually do hit
her. Frankly, I have never understood the discourse about "moral luck" because
the consequences of action are not simply a matter of bad luck.29 They are an
integral part of an action as perceived and evaluated in its social context.
As to point (7), it always seemed to me totally misconceived to punish an
impossible attempt that, on the face of the action, threatens no one. The classic
hypothetical case is putting sugar in the intended victim's coffee on the mistaken
assumption that the sugar is arsenic. The rationale for punishing in this case is
that acting on the basis of the malicious intent demonstrates the dangerousness of
the offender. The remarkable feature of the English-language literature is that
commentators appeal to dangerousness as though it were an unquestioned basis
for criminal liability. By contrast, the post-war German literature has stressed the
ideological significance of shifting from the dangerousness of acts to the
dangerousness of actors. The German theorists insist that a liberal criminal law
must be based on actions (Tatstrafrecht) rather than actors (Tdterstrafrecht). This
issue is not even on the radar screen of American scholarship. The Germans treat
the focus on actors as an expression of Fascist thinking, yet the commentaries to
the MPC take it for granted that actor-oriented thinking is a sensible way to justify
criminal liability.
On the last point, the punishability of negligently causing harm, an approach
sensitive to social content and the way people ordinarily behave, should leave
little doubt about the right approach. We blame others for negligently imposing
great risks on others. The criminal law should do the same. The only way one
could come to the opposite result, I believe, is to adopt a totally artificial theory of
action that stresses the elements of choice or will in external bodily movement.
In Rethinking, there is hardly a doctrine of the common law that escapes
evaluation criticism. And yet, all things considered, my approach in Rethinking is
conservative and traditional. That is, I fall back on social practice or on the
arguments of the post-war Germans in order to mount a serious critique of
common law trends. Paradoxically, Herb Wechsler and the MPC adopted a more
radically critical point of view than my own. As utilitarians, they-like Bentham
before them-could subject the common law to a systematic critique. They could
test every provision to determine whether it efficiently furthers the aims of the
criminal law.
There has long been tension in legal thought between the schools of
Blackstone and Bentham. The Blackstonians invoke theories of rights, sometimes
of natural or human rights. The Benthamites reject rights and argue in the
language of social utility and group welfare-"efficiency" in the idiom of law and
economics. When one of these schools is ascendant, the critics gravitate toward
the alternative point of view. If efficiency is the reigning view, the natural
tendency is the opposite-namely, to argue in the language of rights. If human
29. The leading works, often cited, are Bernard Williams, Moral Luck, in Moral Luck 35 (Daniel
Statmen ed., SUNY Press 1993), and Thomas Nagel, Mortal Questions 24-38 (Cambridge U. Press
1979).
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rights become entrenched as the orthodoxy-as they had in the infamous 1905
case of Lochner v. New York 3 -the critical method requires argument in the
language of social welfare and efficiency.
The Benthamites have been ascendant in the common law, at least since the
period of the New Deal. Wechsler and the MPC applied their methodology to the
criminal law, but under the leadership of Ronald Dworkin, the rights theorists-
the Blackstonians-were striking back. On this jurisprudential spectrum, I was
clearly on the side of Dworkin and the Blackstonians.
Much to my surprise and gratification, European readers appreciated
Rethinking as a presentation of the common law in a conceptual framework they
could understand. This was, I gather, a novel event in comparative law. I learned
much from the European reaction and have since consciously pursued the
approach of explaining the common law in the conceptual framework of
Continental legal thought.3'
The reception of Rethinking in the United States was much more
enthusiastic than I expected. It is gratifying to me that a whole generation of
American scholars, well represented in this symposium, take the issues of criminal
theory very seriously. It is not the case, however, that all the ideas I elaborated in
Rethinking have found an audience. There has been a lot of attention paid to the
theory of justification and excuse, but other important ideas have gone by the
wayside. There has been almost no interest in my theory of manifest criminality
and the application of the principle to the problem of impossible attempts. Nor
did my conceptualization of three patterns of liability-manifest criminality,
subjective criminality, and harmful consequences-attract much discussion.32 If
Rethinking is to be remembered, I would like it to be appreciated for its
comparative effort to communicate an understanding of Continental thought to
theorists in common law countries, reciprocally, to provide those outside the
tradition with access to American thinking in criminal law.
II. INTELLECTUAL JOURNEYS
One of the consequences of writing Rethinking was my development of
closer ties with scholars abroad. My links with German scholars date back to my
period of study in Freiburg in 1964-1965 and even more significantly my first
lecture tour in the summer of 1976 at the invitation of Klaus Ltiderssen in
Frankfurt. I also found the other criminal law specialists in Frankfurt to be a rich
source of ideas-in particular, Winfried Hassemer and Wolfgang Naucke. I
returned there as a visiting professor in the spring of 1980. My close working
relationship with Albin Eser dates from the summer of 1976, and he provided me
with considerable intellectual support when he came to UCLA for several months
during the period I was writing Rethinking.
30. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 74-76 (Holmes, J. dissenting).
31. This approach is followed in George P. Fletcher & Steve Sheppard, American Law in a Global
Context: The Basics (Oxford U. Press forthcoming 2005).
32. See text accopmanying infra n. 36.
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Since the early 1970s, I have also had close working relationships with
several scholars in Israel. Many were my students at the Hebrew University in
Jerusalem, and several others came to Columbia in the 1980s and 1990s. Among
them are Miriam Gur-Aryeh, Alon Harel, Mordechai Kremnitzer, Yoram
Shachar, and Ron Shapira. They seem to have transplanted the style and many of
the ideas from Rethinking to Israeli soil, though I remain bemused by the failure
of Hebrew-speaking lawyers to develop precise analogues for the terms
"justification" and "excuse."
My collegial bonds with Spanish and Italian criminal lawyers would await
work that I did after Rethinking. There was little time was for outreach toward
other countries when, in the mid-eighties, the United States started to become
preoccupied by high-profile criminal trials. The Goetz case was the first of a series
of prosecutions (ending, I believe, with the O.J. Simpson case in 1995) that
dominated discussions of criminal law for a decade. In the summer of 1986 when I
read that the New York Court of Appeals had ruled, correctly, that Goetz's
shooting four blacks in the subway had to be judged against a reasonable person
standard, I immediately sensed that the pending trial would be the ideal
laboratory for testing the ability of criminal trials to domesticate complicated
issues of theory and structure in criminal law. The trial of Bernard Goetz proved
to be a microcosm of virtually all the questions that intrigued theoreticians of
criminal law. Writing A Crime of Self-Defense was a thrilling project in which I
sought to explain the ideas set forth in Rethinking to a general audience. With
regard to the theory of criminal law there was not much new in the book. In a
review in the ABA Journal, Paul Robinson insightfully and amusingly described
the treatment of criminal law in the book as Rethinking in "short pants. 33
On a visit to the United States, Francisco Mufioz Conde, professor of
criminal law in Sevilla, Spain, noticed the Goetz book on sale in a bookstore. He
picked it up, read it, and made a remarkable decision to introduce American
thinking about criminal law into the Spanish legal culture. His translation, En
defensa propia, was the beginning of a very productive collaboration and an
enriching friendship. Eventually he translated three of my books and, after the
appearance of each, accompanied me on a lecture tour around Spain. As a new
kind of legal literature-an in-depth study of a particular case coupled with
theoretical reflections on the criminal law-A Crime of Self-Defense also appealed
to translators in several other countries.34
There were too many engaging developments in the late 1980s and early
1990s for me to think seriously about a second edition of Rethinking. My first
major intellectual detour occurred after some personal experiences prompted me
to explore loyalty, both personal and national, as a legitimate moral value. My
book-length treatment of the subject appeared in 1992, 3 and though I did not
33. Paul H. Robinson, Books for Lawyers: Revenge of the Nerd, 74 ABA J. 112 (Sept. 1, 1988).
34. Translations have appeared in German, Japanese, and Italian.
35. George P. Fletcher, Loyalty: An Essay on the Morality of Relationships (Oxford U. Press 1993).
The personal experiences that influenced me are discussed in the introduction at pages ix-xii.
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think of the book as a revision of my theory of criminal law, it was clear that new
lines of conceptualization were taking hold.
The centerpiece of the first half of Rethinking was a set of three patterns of
liability: manifest criminality, subjective criminality, and harmful consequences.
This was an entirely original way of grouping the offenses that constitute most
systems of criminal law. Winfried Hassemer, one of the few readers ever engaged
by this analysis, paid me a compliment by describing these three patterns as the
"middle part" of the criminal law.36 They were not the general part because they
treated the subject matter of the special part, but nor were they the special part
because they were not abstracted from the positive law of any particular
jurisdiction. I discussed treason as one of many offenses rent by the dialectic
between manifest and subjective criminality.37 The specific point of tension was
the requirement of an "overt act," which dates back to the first treason statute
enacted in the reign of Edward III in 1351-1352. The problem is whether the overt
act requirement is satisfied by an act in furtherance of the treason (subjective
criminality) or only by an act that manifests the treasonous purpose (manifest
criminality).
Beginning with the discussion of treason in Loyalty, I began to appreciate
disloyalty and treason as a separate model of liability-a fourth pattern, as Cole
Durham dubbed it.38 The foundation of treason is the breach of a relationship. In
virtually all countries of the world, only those owing a duty of allegiance can
betray their countries-and this special duty of loyalty is typically limited to
citizens, nationals, or permanent residents. Requiring this special relationship
distinguishes treason from the standard crimes of murder, theft, and rape, which
are committed against strangers as well as acquaintances. The implication is that
treason is a parochial crime-that is, it is wrong only from the standpoint of the
state that is betrayed. In contrast, the core violent offenses are universal in
nature-they are wrong by whomever and against whoever committed. Working
out the implications of this distinction is now one of my major concerns. It has
particular relevance on the plane of international and regional criminal law.39
Thinking about loyalty in the criminal law also has repercussions in the
theory of excuses. The problem is accounting for a range of third persons whose
intervention on behalf of a person under threat will be excused as "involuntary."
We are inclined to say that the intervention of a parent to save a child in danger is
involuntary in this extended sense. Of course, there is a choice to intervene, but
we could not reasonably expect a parent to stand by while his or her child is being
36. Winfried Hassemer, formerly professor of criminal law in Frankfurt, is now Vice President of
the German Constitutional Court.
37. Fletcher, supra n. 1, at 202-13.
38. Cole Durham made this comment to me during a private conversation shortly after 1993.
39. See George P. Fletcher, International vs. European Criminal Law, _ J. Intl. Crim. J. -
(forthcoming 2005).
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killed. The factor of loyalty from parent to child accounts for our intuitions of
involuntariness in this contexti 0
With my work on loyalty, I had obviously undertaken a new approach
toward the general principles elaborated in Rethinking. The next major shift in
my sentiments occurred when I witnessed the Los Angeles riots in the wake of the
verdict of not guilty in the 1993 trial of the four LAPD officers who had
maliciously beaten up Rodney King. I realized for the first time that in Rethinking
I had paid no attention to the victim's side of the criminal trial. I had always been
skeptical about victimology because my impression was that this sociological
school attempted to bring the victim into a causal account of the specific crime.
Victims contribute, they say, to their own harm. Of course they do in some cases,
but this causal analysis is irrelevant to the normative analysis. We should not
punish a nighttime rapist in the park less because his victim decided foolishly to go
running late at night in an isolated part of the park. The confusion between causal
and normative analysis posed a serious danger to the moral foundations of the
criminal law.
The Rodney King riots and the subsequent federal trial enabled me to
appreciate the role of the criminal law in bringing justice to victims, particularly to
minority victims. As a collective group, those who identify with the concrete
victim have legitimate demands in the criminal process. If the state fails to
prosecute or whitewashes the charges, those who identified with the victim feel
like second-class citizens. It was not clear what kind of voice victims should have
in the criminal process. I undertook a study of the problem, and the result was a
passionate 1995 book called With Justice for Some: Victims' Rights in Criminal
Trials.
41
This study in victim's rights anticipated the dramatic recognition in the
Rome Statute of "impunity" of offenders as a major concern of the international
community. In the 1990s, the entire field of criminal law started to undergo a
transformation from an exclusive concern with the rights of the accused toward
greater recognition of the interests of victims.
About the time With Justice for Some was published, I applied for a grant
from the Humboldt Foundation and identified a second edition of Rethinking as
my primary project. I received the grant, which enabled me to spend some time at
the Max Planck Institute in Freiburg. Oxford University Press offered me a
contract for the second edition. The project was "off and running" but I was
unsure of its direction.
My original plan was to make good on my assertion in the introduction to
Rethinking that criminal law was a species of "political and moral philosophy." I
needed to delve more deeply into philosophical issues in order to explicate the
moral and political foundations of the criminal law. A detour into philosophical
40. Claire 0. Finkelstein, Duress: A Philosophical Account of the Defense in the Law, 37 Ariz. L.
Rev. 251 (1995).
41. George P. Fletcher, With Justice for Some: Victims' Rights in Criminal Trials (Addison-Wesley
Publg. 1995).
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questions enriched my thought. In 1996 Oxford brought out Basic Concepts of
Legal Thought,42 which was an expanded version of some lectures I had given in
Italy in the early 1990s. 413 In this book-written for students, with few academic
pretensions-I had a chance to explore my jurisprudential commitments on the
nature of law, discretion, morality, efficiency, equality, and other basic themes.
In order to develop my ideas about a new version of Rethinking, I decided to
write a short introduction to the basic theoretical questions of the field, expressing
my current take on the foundational questions of the field. I adopted a mode of
exposition that has proven to be effective. The thesis is that the entire general
part of the criminal law inhabits twelve areas of discourse defined by an equal
number of conceptual distinctions. The boundaries discussed among the twelve
distinctions include, for example, the differences between substance and
procedure, subjects and objects of action, offenses and defenses, and self-defense
in contrast to necessity. The argument is that these distinctions are implicit in
every system of criminal law, although the exact point of demarcation may vary
from system to system.
My exposition in Basic Concepts of Criminal Law" includes several new
positions-in particular, my skepticism about whether recklessness, defined as
conscious risk-taking, is always worse than inadvertent risk-taking.4 5 This grading
is assumed in the MPC,46 and it is widely shared in other legal cultures. Also, for
the first time, I put to paper my theory of communicative human action.47 This
theory is related to the contextual theory of action expressed above, but with
emphasis on the expressive nature of action. There were several other
innovations as well. The treatment of mistake is more exhaustive than I had
offered in Rethinking.4s The overriding point was to stress the trans-national
structure of the twelve basic distinctions. This was the beginning of my articulated
universal theory of criminal law.
Oxford published this prelude to the revised version of Rethinking in 1998,
and it quickly found translators around the world. Professor Mufioz Conde was
able to get his successful Spanish edition on the market several months before the
English version appeared.4 9  Russian and Kazakh editions appeared shortly
thereafter, and work is underway now to produce translations in Chinese and in
Persian. The translation that most pleased me in particular has been the recent
Italian version by Professor Michele Papa in Florence. Papa coined a new title for
the book: La Grammatica del diritto penale. To translate is, of course, to interpret,
42. George P. Fletcher, Basic Concepts of Legal Thought (Oxford U. Press 1996).
43. See Introduzione Elementare alla Scienza Giuridica: I. Cardozo Lectures in Law (George P.
Fletcher, Pier G. Monateri & Ugo Mattei eds., Cedam Publications 1993).
44. George P. Fletcher, Basic Concepts of Criminal Law (Oxford U. Press 1998).
45. Id. at 116.
46. Model Penal Code § 2.02(2).
47. Fletcher, supra n. 44, at 48.
48. Id. at 211-12.
49. George P. Fletcher, Conceptos Bdsicos de Derecho Penal (F. Mufioz Conde trans., Tirant lo
Blanch 1997).
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and Papa's interpretation captures the spirit of the book. My project was indeed
to elaborate a universal grammar of criminal law.
As all this was going on at the end of the twentieth and the beginning of the
twenty-first centuries, criminal law was undergoing radical change. With the
advent of the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and the
agreement on the Rome Statute in the summer of 1998, comparative criminal law
was rapidly merging with international law. It turned out that it was impossible to
proceed with international criminal prosecutions without seeking a synthesis of
common law and Continental principles, both at the level of substance and of
procedure. It took me a few years to realize this, but in the wake of September 11,
2001, and after the Rome Statute came into force on July 1, 2002, I was convinced
that the theory of criminal law had an important role to play in the refinement and
development of international criminal law.
Ii. THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW
My original conception of a second edition of Rethinking was undergoing
change as well. I was never capable of the deceptive task of updating the
footnotes to the 1978 edition and calling it a new book. For several years the draft
I worked on consisted of virtually all-new material. Thus I thought I would
publish a new "version" of Rethinking under a clever title like "Rethinking
Rethinking." But after Oxford published a reprint edition in 2000 and the book
continued to have an audience, my editor at Oxford, Cynthia Read, and I decided
against publishing another book under the same title. The new book would be a
sequel to Rethinking but catalogued under a different title. My thoughts turned to
Universalizing Criminal Law as a title that would capture my hypothesis that
criminal law rests on certain philosophical premises of universal validity.
But my interest in international criminal law has continued to grow, largely
due to a very fruitful association with Antonio Cassese of Florence. His work,
both as former president of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, and as a professor of International Law in Florence, is a model of
clear-headed and thorough scholarship, 0 but he has also supported me in my
conviction that international criminal law requires a substantial infusion of
theoretical and comparative scholarship in criminal law. Those who drafted and
negotiated the Rome Statute were primarily international lawyers with little
knowledge or interest in the basic principles of criminal liability. Their interest in
moral and political philosophy was even less serious than their mastery of the
literature of criminal law.
It is striking that the philosophical literature on the theory of just war and
the commentaries on the Rome Statute seem to have nothing to do with each
other. Michael Walzer's book Just and Unjust Wars51 is properly influential
50. See Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law (Oxford U. Press 2003). Cassese is also the
founder and editor of the new and important Journal of International Criminal Justice.
51. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (3d ed.,
Basic Bks. 2000).
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among philosophers and political scientists, but it is never cited in the literature on
international criminal law. Even more seriously, the philosophical doctrine of
double effect, important in Walzer's work and critical for understanding the law of
war, is totally ignored in the legal commentaries. The results are extremely
unfortunate. Allow me to explain.
The moral premise of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and of the Rome
Statute is the absolute prohibition against intentionally killing civilians and other
protected persons. This is an application of the basic idea, anchored in the book
of Genesis and developed both in the Christian and secular moral traditions, that
it is wrong-indeed absolutely wrong-intentionally to kill the innocent.52  In
international law, the word "civilian" has taken the place of the word "innocent."
The problems are what it means to kill "intentionally" and whether the
prohibition is truly absolute or whether it may yield to considerations of military
necessity.
The Catholic doctrine of double effect leads us to the conclusion that
"intentionally" should be narrowly construed to mean, in effect, what the Model
Penal Code means by "purposely." The death of civilians must be the actor's
"conscious object," not the side effect of his action. Under the MPC, expecting
some civilians to die as a side effect of a bombing mission is not enough to make
the deaths purposeful and it should not be sufficient under the Rome Statute for
an intentional killing. This narrow construction is the only way to maintain an
absolute prohibition against intentional killing. If the interpretation of intentional
killing encompasses side effects-collateral damage, as it is now called-then the
temptation is to introduce a corrective under the principle of necessity to restrict
liability to those cases of serious wrongdoing.
Unfortunately, both the drafters and the commentators to the Rome Statute
have taken a broad view of intentionality, so that intentional killing seems to
include any action undertaken in the knowledge that the death of civilians is a
foreseeable side effect.53 Without any authority to support their conclusions,
many international legal commentators venture the opinion that "intentional" in
the Rome Statute includes "reckless" killing.54 This proposed expansion of
liability far exceeds the moral foundations of the law of war and necessitates a
corrective under the defense of necessity.55
52. Elsewhere I have traced this prohibition to the principles expressed in Genesis 9:6 that human
beings are created in God's image. See George P. Fletcher, In God's Image: The Religious Imperative
of Equality under Law, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1608, 1618 (1999).
53. Rome Statute art. 30(2)(b) (includes within the ambit of intentional conduct any consequence
that the actor "is aware.., will occur in the ordinary course of events"). This appears to be
functionally equivalent to a foreseeability standard.
54. Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 527-35 (Otto Triffterer ed.,
Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 1999); The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A
Commentary 898-902 (Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta & John R.W.D. Jones eds., Oxford U. Press
2002).
55. Rome Statute art. 31(1)(d) recognizes a claim of necessity that is compromised by the
requirement of duress. In order to generate the necessary corrective under a principle of necessity, the
court would have to develop a new defense under Article 31(3) comparable to Model Penal Code §
3.02.
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The international lawyers who make these claims have an ingrained bias in
favor of victims and of the prosecution. The Preamble to the Rome Statute
stresses the importance of punishing the guilty but never mentions the traditional
value of protecting the innocent.56 This bias toward victims makes the ICC
different from other systems of criminal law that typically begin with a
commitment to the rights of the accused and then struggle to accommodate the
interests of victim. 57 This victim-orientation of the ICC makes it imperative that
criminal lawyers intervene, both in theory and in practice, to correct the imbalance
and to protect the rights of the accused.
The drafters of the Rome Statute had the foresight to understand that they
could not do a perfect job. They recognized the necessity of ongoing legal
development. Further, in the tradition of both international law and Continental
legal thought, they acknowledged the role of scholars as well as judges in
elaborating "general principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of
legal systems of the world. 5 ' There may be some imperfections in the Rome
Statute as drafted, but the field of international criminal law is still in its infancy,
and in time we should expect the scholarly literature and the case law to bring the
necessary refinements to the system.
The importance of addressing these issues convinced me that the sequel to
Rethinking should bring to bear my philosophical and comparative work to the
task of Internationalizing Criminal Law. This is the apt title for a sequel to
Rethinking Criminal Law. My aim in the book is to bring together current
developments in the theory of criminal law, in comparative criminal law, and in
international criminal law itself.
The present manuscript is divided into four parts. Part One addresses
general foundational questions of criminal law, all considered from a comparative
point of view, with frequent reference to the Rome Statute. The centerpiece of
this part will be two chapters on the philosophical dimensions of criminal law-
one on political theory and the other on moral theory. The thesis bridging these
chapters is that political analysis must precede any reference to moral issues. The
justification of punishment is ultimately a political and not a moral issue.
Someone might deserve punishment but it does not follow that the state is
justified in imposing it. The latter question depends on the theory of legitimate
political power and whether it includes the authority to impose criminal sanctions.
Morality becomes relevant in the theory of criminal law only because a political
theory makes it relevant. This is a critical point. It turns contrary to the views of
many retributivists who think that their stand on moral desert resolves the
question of just punishment.
The second part focuses on the foundations of international criminal justice,
with particular attention devoted to the problems of universal jurisdiction and the
56. See Rome Statute preamble.
57. For example, Model Penal Code § 1.02(1) expresses a commitment to protect the accused
against false convictions and says nothing about the interests of victims.
58. Rome Statute art. 21(1)(c); see Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38.
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theoretical foundations of jurisdiction in the International Criminal Court. I
expose the weakness of the conventional arguments in favor of universal
jurisdiction and strongly endorse the ICC. Yet the premises of the ICC raise
profound problems of political theory that have not been adequately addressed.
The ICC merges three totally distinct ideas-the tradition of international
law based on the liability of states, the principle of individual criminal liability, and
the ability of the United Nations Security Council to institute courts for the
purpose of maintaining international peace and security.5 9 How these strands are
to be reconciled requires a serious "rethinking" of democratic principles. The
major problem is whether a state can determine where its citizens should be tried
for their crimes. A proper analysis of this question takes us back to the problem
of when and where particular institutions enjoy "the right to punish." Addressing
these problems adequately remains a great academic challenge. The second part
also includes an extended analysis of the law of war and the problems faced in
American law in the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001.
The third part of the book addresses the problem of finding a synthesis of
systems of criminal law. Two distinct methods of synthesis are considered, both
with elements that might be considered universal when extrapolated across
existing systems of criminal law. The first begins with the idea of punishment and
the other with the idea of human action. The first approaches criminal law from
the top down, that is, beginning with the state's response to crime. The other
begins from the bottom up, that is, with the theory of human action as a basic
constituent of criminal liability. These efforts at synthesizing-and thus
universalizing-criminal law provide a possible contribution to the effort to
supplement the Rome Statute with "general principles of law derived by the Court
from national laws of legal systems of the world." 6
The fourth part of the book turns to the tensions between universalization
and internationalization. I elaborate three distinct types of universal law.
International law-particularly its core principles-has pretensions of
universality. It is applicable to all states at all times. The ICC is based on a claim
to be the court of last resort for all countries in the world, even for those who have
not ratified the Rome Statute. The second type of universality is represented by
the comparative synthesis developed in Part Two. The third type derives from my
system of twelve distinctions developed in Basic Concepts. Here I apply those
twelve distinctions as a framework for reviewing the doctrinal features of the
Rome Statute. The criminal law advanced by the statute is treated like any other
system of positive law. The universality implicit in this analysis is not that of the
Rome Statute, but rather the meta-structure incorporated in the twelve
distinctions.
The ultimate tension between universality and internationalization recurs in
all legal systems. The positive law invariably domesticates the impulse toward
59. U. N. Charter art. 52-54.
60. Rome Statute art. 21(1)(c).
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generating abstract principles that apply everywhere. All law eventually becomes
the law of a particular system. Americans would like to think of due process as a
universal standard of justice, but the concept of due process is invariably
compromised by the authority of American courts. Blackstone thought that the
common law was the embodiment of pure reason, but reason is invariably subject
to interpretation and bound by precedent. The same will happen with the Rome
Statute. The law of the ICC will be its own law-not the universal conceptual and
moral truths to which we aspire. Yet we must keep the dialectic alive. By pressing
for universal principles of criminal law, we enable international law to be more
than the conventional law governing relations among states. International
criminal law, in particular, must maintain its mission of being the single law that
should govern all humans everywhere.
